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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal involves government restrictions on speech 
at a publicly owned arena in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The 
primary issue we must resolve is whether the government’s 
policy sequestering all protest activity to enclosures by each 
entrance of the Mohegan Sun Arena is facially unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment. In a public forum—a government 
space dedicated to the free exchange of ideas—the governing 
authority may not confine speech in this way without showing 
its restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
interest. But the animal rights activists challenging the policy 
have conceded that the Arena’s concourse is a nonpublic 
forum, a space which the government may reasonably reserve 
for its intended purpose. As the concourse’s function is to 
facilitate movement of pedestrians into and out of the Arena, 
we cannot find unreasonable a policy sensibly designed to 
minimize interference with that flow. Accordingly, we will 
reverse the District Court’s order because the policy is 
constitutional. But because the government has not met its 
burden to show the other two policies at issue—bans on 
profanity and voice amplification—are reasonable, we will 
affirm the court’s injunction of those policies. 
 
I. 
A. 
Defendant Luzerne County Convention Center 
Authority owns the Mohegan Sun Arena, a large event space 
in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The Arena—which holds up to 
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10,000 people—hosts athletic and other commercial 
entertainment events, including national touring acts like the 
circus, concerts, Disney on Ice, and World Wrestling 
Entertainment. Though the Arena is publicly owned, it 
operates as a business that must earn enough to pay its 
expenses. The Authority contracts with Defendant SMG to 
manage the Arena’s day-to-day operations. 
 
The Arena building is set back from the public road and 
surrounded by several large parking lots. Patrons attending 
events at the Arena drive from the public road onto an access 
road, park in one of the lots, and then walk to the Arena’s 
entrances. This is the only way to access the Arena, as it is 
separated from the public road by a grass median and fence. A 
large concrete concourse connects the parking lots to the 
Arena. The concourse houses two entrances for the Arena’s 
patrons, termed the “East Gate” and “West Gate,” and includes 
a pathway between the two gates.1 The concourse is generally 
open to the public but primarily used by patrons attending 
Arena events. 
 
 Under the Arena’s protest policy, “[a]ll persons are 
welcome to express their views” at the Arena. App. 400. The 
Arena’s policy imposes several limits on protest activity, three 
of which are at issue here. First, protesters must stand within 
“designated area[s]” on the concourse and “[h]andouts can 
only be distributed from within” those areas (the “location 
condition”). Id. The designated areas are two “rectangular 
                                              
1  The part of the concourse in front of the East Gate 
measures 18,746 square feet, the area in front of the West Gate 
measures 10,560 square feet, and the sidewalk connecting the 
two is 321 feet long and 30 feet wide. 
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enclosure[s] constructed from bike racks” that are 500 to 700 
square feet and set up on the concourse next to the East and 
West Gates. Pomicter v. Luzerne Cty. Convention Ctr. Auth., 
322 F. Supp. 3d 558, 565 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (hereinafter 
Pomicter II). Second, the policy bans protesters from using 
profanity and “promotional verbiage suggesting vulgarity or 
profanity” (the “profanity ban”). App. 400. Finally, the protest 
policy prohibits any artificial voice amplification (the 
“amplification ban”). Id. 
 
B. 
In 2016, Silvie Pomicter and Last Chance for Animals 
(LCA) sued the Authority and SMG, contending the Arena’s 
protest policy infringes their free speech rights. In a facial 
challenge, they allege the policy violates the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and Article I of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.2 Pomicter—who, along with LCA, 
                                              
2  Plaintiffs bring their federal constitutional claims 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a remedy for 
deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States when the deprivation takes place under color 
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory.” Pomicter v. Luzerne Cty. Convention Ctr. 
Auth., No. 16-632, 2016 WL 1706165, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 
27, 2016) (hereinafter Pomicter I) (quoting Lugar v. 
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982)). In ruling on 
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court 
found that the Authority was “a public governmental entity 
acting under color of state law” and that SMG, though 
nominally a private entity, was a “‘willful participant in joint 
activity’ with the Authority and thus qualifie[d] as a state 
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opposes the use of animals by circuses—had protested at past 
circus performances at the Arena, and she alleged her 
confinement to the enclosures limited her ability to 
communicate with patrons. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from enforcing the 
location condition, the profanity ban, and the amplification 
ban. 
 
Immediately after filing their complaint, Plaintiffs 
moved for a preliminary injunction challenging the location 
condition only. They planned to protest at upcoming circus 
performances at the Arena and sought to protest and distribute 
leaflets outside the designated areas. After holding an 
evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted Plaintiffs’ 
motion in part, finding the location condition “unreasonable ‘in 
light of the characteristic nature and function’ of the Arena.” 
Pomicter I, 2016 WL 1706165, at *5 (quoting United States v. 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732 (1990)). It crafted a less restrictive 
policy in its injunction. The injunction allowed up to twenty 
protesters to distribute literature and talk to patrons within a 
circumscribed section of the concourse,3 but protesters could 
not approach anyone in line or otherwise “block the ingress or 
egress of patrons.” App. 107.  
                                              
actor.” Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941). Defendants do not 
challenge these correct gateway determinations on appeal. 
3  The Court noted the concourse comprises two distinct 
sections. The “entry bridge”—the 37 feet surrounding each 
entrance gate—is a light concrete, and the 60 feet between the 
entry bridge and the parking lot is a darker shade. Pomicter I, 
2016 WL 1706165, at *2. The injunction did not permit 
protesting in the entry bridge or the first six feet of the dark 
concrete from the parking lots. 
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Plaintiffs protested under the terms of the preliminary 
injunction at circus performances at the Arena in 2016 and in 
2017. The Court later held a bench trial. Pomicter testified that, 
during the circus protest in 2016, twelve protesters left the 
designated areas to protest on the concourse. They were able 
to distribute far more literature than the protesters in the 
designated areas, who attracted little attention from patrons. 
Plaintiffs also introduced videos of the protest, which showed 
mainly nonconfrontational interactions between patrons and 
protesters, with no abnormal congestion created on the 
concourse.4  
 
While Plaintiffs focused on the circus protests under the 
terms of the injunction, Defendants emphasized that the policy 
was designed to deal with the range of potential groups that 
may protest at the Arena. Brian Sipe, the Arena’s General 
Manager, testified that, while Plaintiffs were not unruly 
protesters, the Arena expected other groups may be less 
cooperative. Because the Arena may not be able to effectively 
manage protesters outside the designated areas, the location 
condition minimizes congestion and security risks, and allows 
law enforcement to more easily control crowds at the Arena. 
 
The District Court ruled in favor of Plaintiffs and found 
all three restrictions violated the First Amendment.5 As to the 
                                              
4  The videos were only taken before Arena events as 
patrons were entering; there were no videos showing traffic 
flow as patrons exited the Arena. 
5  In addition, because “[t]he corresponding Pennsylvania 
constitutional provision ‘provides protection for freedom of 
expression that is broader than the federal constitutional 
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location condition and amplification ban, the Court discounted 
Defendants’ proffered explanations for the policies, finding 
them speculative and unreasonable. See Pomicter II, 322 F. 
Supp. 3d at 571. As to the profanity ban, the Court held it 
“unreasonably singles out First Amendment activity by 
imposing” the ban “on protesters alone.” Id. at 577. It entered 
judgment for Plaintiffs and enjoined Defendants from 
enforcing the three restrictions, though it noted more carefully 
crafted restrictions may be permissible.6 Defendants now 
appeal.7 
                                              
guarantee[,]’” the court held the restrictions were also 
“unreasonable under Pennsylvania law.” Pomicter II, 322 F. 
Supp. 3d at 567 (quoting Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 
591, 605 (Pa. 2002)) (second alteration in original). 
6  Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment because the 
Court’s opinion and injunction did not specifically address 
whether protesters could carry signs outside the enclosures. 
The Court issued a supplemental opinion and order holding 
Defendants could not confine protesters with signs to the 
designated areas. According to the Court, “the reasoning of 
permitting leafletting activity applies with equal force to the 
act of carrying signs and picketing.” Pomicter v. Luzerne Cty. 
Convention Ctr. Auth., No. 16-632, 2018 WL 2325407, at *4 
(M.D. Pa. May 22, 2018). 
7  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
On appeal from a bench trial, our Court “reviews a district 
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of 
law de novo.” VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 
F.3d 273, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2014). We review an order granting 
injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. Alpha Painting & 
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II. 
The First Amendment, applied to state and local 
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits 
laws and regulations “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. 
Const. amend. I. As noted, the Arena’s protest policy confines 
all protest activity to the designated enclosures, in addition to 
banning profanity and artificial voice amplification. Our 
precedent is clear that these restrictions implicate protected 
speech. See Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F.3d 263, 269 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“[L]eafletting, sign displays, and oral 
communication . . . are indisputably protected forms of 
expression.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Startzell v. 
City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 199 n.10 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[A]mplified speech, such as through the use of bullhorns, is 
protected expression.”).  
 
Protected speech is not immune from regulation. See 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 799 (1985) (“Even protected speech is not equally 
permissible in all places and at all times.”). The forum in which 
the speech takes place governs what regulation is permissible, 
and, in a nonpublic forum like the concourse here, protected 
speech is subject to reasonable regulations. 
 
A. 
In assessing the Authority’s restriction on protected 
speech, we are guided by the forum analysis, which serves “as 
                                              
Constr. Co. v. Del. River Port Auth. of Pa. & N.J., 853 F.3d 
671, 683 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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a means of determining when the Government’s interest in 
limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose 
outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for 
other purposes.” Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726 (quoting Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 800). Under this framework, “the extent to which 
the Government can control access depends on the nature of 
the relevant forum.” Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800). 
On one side of the spectrum is a public forum, property that 
“has been traditionally open to the public for expressive 
activity, such as public streets and parks.” Id.  In these spaces, 
“the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply 
circumscribed.” United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 
279 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Time, place, and 
manner restrictions must be content neutral and narrowly 
tailored, while content-based restrictions must meet the even 
higher bar of being the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling government interest. Id. In designated public 
forums—property “which the state has opened for use by the 
public as a place for expressive activity”—restrictions on 
speech are examined the same way. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 
U.S. at 45.8  
 
In nonpublic forums—government property that is not 
dedicated to First Amendment activity—the government has 
more “flexibility to craft rules limiting speech.” Minn. Voters 
                                              
8  The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he 
government does not create a public forum by inaction or by 
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening 
a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 802 (citation omitted). 
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All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018). Although it “does 
not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment 
constraints,” Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725, “the government, ‘no 
less than a private owner of property,’ retains the ‘power to 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated,’” Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1885 
(quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)). This is 
because “[n]othing in the Constitution requires the 
Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise 
their right to free speech on every type of Government property 
without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption 
that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.” Id. (quoting 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799–800). Rather, the government may 
reserve a nonpublic forum “for its intended purposes, 
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on 
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression 
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Id. 
(quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46). In a nonpublic 
forum, speech restrictions need only be reasonable, “a much 
more limited review” than applied in public forums. Int’l Soc’y 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 
(1992). 
 
Here, the relevant forum, or the “specific public 
property that [Plaintiffs] seek[] to access,” is the concourse 
outside the Arena. NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, 834 F.3d 
435, 442 (3d Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs concede in this suit that the 
concourse is a nonpublic forum. “The question whether a 
particular [property] is a public or a nonpublic forum is highly 
fact-specific and no one factor is dispositive.” Marcavage, 609 
F.3d at 275. In the absence of evidence and argument to the 
contrary, we accept Plaintiffs’ concession that the concourse is 
being used at present as a nonpublic forum. Cf. United States 
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v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 649 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding walkways 
“not dedicated to serve the traditional functions of streets or 
parks, but rather for the particular function of accommodating 
post office patrons on official business,” were a nonpublic 
forum); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. N.J. 
Sports & Exposition Auth., 691 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(reasoning that “commercial” nature of sports complex made it 
a nonpublic forum). We caution, however, that a public arena 
and its entranceway may not always be treated this way. If 
there was evidence showing, for example, that the concourse 
was “used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions,” our 
analysis would be different. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 
(quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); cf. Paulsen 
v. Cty. of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1991).9 
 
As noted, speech restrictions in nonpublic forums must 
be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and 
                                              
9  We also emphasize that Plaintiffs bring a facial 
challenge, where we must assess whether the policy is 
“unconstitutional in all of its applications.” Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 
(2008). Plaintiffs’ challenge here is limited to the Arena’s use 
as a nonpublic forum. If the speech restrictions pass muster 
under the reasonableness analysis, they cannot be facially 
invalid. But that is not to say that the restrictions are 
constitutional in every application. Though Plaintiffs don’t 
raise the point, the District Court noted that the Arena has 
hosted political events and rallies in the past. If an as-applied 
challenge were raised in this context, both our reasoning and 
conclusion could be different. But as noted, Plaintiffs conceded 
this is a nonpublic forum. 
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viewpoint neutral. There is no claim that the Arena’s protest 
policy discriminates based on viewpoint or that it is enforced 
in a discriminatory way. Accordingly, we must examine 
whether the policy is “reasonable in light of the purpose served 
by the forum.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citation omitted). 
 
B. 
Because of the importance of the interests protected by 
the First Amendment, the government bears the burden to 
show its speech restrictions are reasonable. See NAACP, 834 
F.3d at 443. But unlike in public forums, the government’s 
“burden to establish reasonableness” in nonpublic forums “is a 
light one.” Id. at 449. Since the “flexibility” afforded to the 
government in these settings is justified by the government’s 
ability to preserve property for its intended uses, Minn. Voters 
All., 138 S. Ct. at 1885, the government must provide a 
legitimate explanation for the restriction in “light of the 
purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances,” 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809. To be “legitimate,” the 
government’s explanation must be supported by either record 
evidence or “commonsense inferences” based on the record. 
NAACP, 834 F.3d at 445. Once this requirement is met, though, 
we give the government latitude to devise appropriate 
regulations. “Even if more narrowly tailored regulations could 
be promulgated,” the government “is only required to adopt 
reasonable regulations, not ‘the most reasonable or the only 
reasonable’ regulation possible.” Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 735–36 
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 808). 
 
For instance, in a case similar to the one now before us, 
we reviewed a policy prohibiting solicitation and leafletting at 
the Meadowlands sports complex. See N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 
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161. We rejected a challenge by plaintiffs who sought 
simultaneously to solicit donations and distribute literature at 
the race track and arena.10 Among other justifications for the 
policy, the government explained solicitation “would compete 
with the Authority for its patrons’ money and disrupt the 
normal activities of the complex.” Id. Having found that the 
Meadowlands was a commercial venture expected to generate 
revenue, we determined “it is not unreasonable for the 
Authority to prohibit outside groups from engaging in 
activities which are counterproductive to its objectives.” Id. 
Although it was certainly possible to conceive of more limited 
or carefully tailored restrictions than an absolute ban on 
solicitation—such as restrictions prescribing the time or place 
when solicitation is permitted—we did not require the 
government to take such steps. Because the restriction was 
reasonably explained in light of the purpose of the forum, it 
was constitutional. 
 
The flexibility of the reasonableness standard also 
empowers the government to act prophylactically. In Perry 
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, for instance, 
the Supreme Court considered a school district policy that 
allowed the bargaining representative teacher’s union—but not 
its rival—access to an internal mail system. See 460 U.S. at 40. 
Stressing the flexibility afforded to the government when 
dealing with a nonpublic forum, the Court held the policy “may 
reasonably be considered a means of insuring labor-peace 
within the schools.” Id. at 52. Even though there was “no 
                                              
10  Although the cases are similar, the result in New Jersey 
Sports does not dictate our outcome here. “Reasonableness is 
a case-specific inquiry, meaning that previous examples are of 
limited usefulness.” NAACP, 834 F.3d at 448. 
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showing in the record of past disturbances” or “evidence that 
future disturbance would be likely,” there is no “require[ment] 
that such proof be present to justify the denial of access to a 
non-public forum on grounds that the proposed use may disrupt 
the property’s intended function.” Id. at 52 n.12. As the Court 
has emphasized, “the Government need not wait until havoc is 
wreaked to restrict access to a nonpublic forum.” Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 810. 
 
 “[A]lthough the government does not need to prove 
that a particular use will actually disrupt the ‘intended 
function’ of its property,” in NAACP we reiterated that the 
record must contain enough “information from which we can 
draw an inference that would support” the speech restriction. 
834 F.3d at 445 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). There, we held the Philadelphia Airport’s ban on 
noncommercial content in its advertising space was not 
reasonable because the city’s explanations were belied by the 
record. The city first contended the policy was intended to 
promote revenue maximization. We concluded this was not a 
legitimate explanation because the record lacked any support 
to connect the ban to this goal; the city’s representative testified 
the ban was not intended to promote revenue and instead cost 
the city money. Id. at 445–46. Commonsense inferences could 
not fill the gap, as we would not accept a justification 
disclaimed in the city’s testimony. Id. at 446. The city next 
sought to justify the ban as a way to avoid controversy, 
pointing to testimony about efforts to make the Airport a 
pleasant place for travelers. Id. at 446–47. But that explanation 
was inconsistent with the record evidence relating to the 
overall nature of the forum, which showed an “onslaught of 
noncommercial content” throughout the Airport. Id. at 447. We 
refused to credit an “inference that [the Airport] would devote 
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its advertising space to a purpose to which the rest of the 
Airport does not subscribe.” Id.  
 
In sum, though the government faces a “relatively low 
bar” to show reasonableness in a nonpublic forum, its speech 
restrictions are still subject to limitation: it may not offer 
justifications unsupported by the record. Id. at 443. The record 
must allow us to “grasp the purpose” of the forum and, 
critically, understand how the speech activity at issue may 
disrupt that purpose. Id. at 445; see also New England Reg’l 
Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(describing reasonableness review as a “fact-intensive” inquiry 
considering “the uses to which the forum typically is put,” the 
“risks associated with the speech activity,” and the “proffered 
rationale”); Hawkins v. City & Cty. of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 
1290 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). If the restrictions are reasonably 
explained, accord with the evidence or commonsense, and are 
connected to the purpose of the forum, we are constrained to 
be lenient in our review. 
 
III. 
In NAACP, we organized the reasonableness analysis 
into two steps, which will guide our analysis here. “First, given 
that reasonableness ‘must be assessed in the light of the 
purpose of the forum and all the surrounding 
circumstances,’” we consider the purpose of the forum. 
NAACP, 834 F.3d at 445 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809). 
Second, we assess whether Defendants have provided a 
legitimate explanation related to the purpose of the forum and 
supported by “evidence or commonsense inferences” for the 
three restrictions at issue here. Id. 
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A. 
We first consider the purpose of the forum. As noted, 
the relevant forum, or the specific space Plaintiffs seek to 
access, is the concourse outside the Arena. Record evidence or 
commonsense inferences must show “the purpose to which the 
[government] has devoted the forum.” Id. Though we focus on 
the concourse, this “does not mean . . . that [we] will ignore the 
special nature and function” of the Arena—which, as we’ve 
described, is a large commercial event space—“in evaluating 
the limits that may be imposed” on protest activity on the 
concourse. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801–02; see also NAACP, 
834 F.3d at 447.  
 
Defendants contend, and the record confirms, that the 
concourse is dedicated to a single purpose: providing for the 
passage of patrons into and out of the Arena. Customers 
attending events at the Arena park in the parking lots and walk 
to the concourse, which provides a pathway for them to enter 
and exit through the Arena’s two gates. Sipe testified that the 
concourse was constructed so that “patrons, after they’re done 
parking their car, can enter into the facility.” App. 281. He 
confirmed that “thousands of people enter[] and exit[] the 
building in a very short period of time” before and after events, 
and the concourse is the only way they may do so. App. 121. 
And because the concourse is next to the parking lot, it is 
important that the areas immediately abutting the lot remain 
clear to prevent “backing people up into the traffic area.” App. 
478. 
 
B. 
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With the forum’s purpose and circumstances in mind, 
the second step is to assess whether Defendants have 
“provide[d] a legitimate explanation for” each of the three 
challenged restrictions. NAACP, 834 F.3d at 445. As we have 
explained, record evidence or commonsense inferences “must 
provide a way of tying the limitation on speech to the forum’s 
purpose.” Id. Accordingly, we will examine the record 
evidence about the three restrictions and assess each restriction 
“in light of the characteristic nature and function” of the forum. 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732 (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981)). 
 
1. 
We begin with the location condition, which requires 
protesters to stand within designated areas on the concourse 
next to the Arena’s two entrance gates. According to 
Defendants, the primary purpose of that restriction is to 
maintain the orderly and safe movement of patrons into and out 
of the Arena. Sipe testified that allowing protesters to freely 
interact with patrons could impede traffic flow as patrons enter 
and exit the Arena. In addition, face-to-face interactions could 
create security risks if a patron disagreed with the protester’s 
message. Finally, he testified that enclosing the protesters to 
the designated areas gives security officers “an easier time with 
crowd control.” App. 287. He explained it would be difficult 
to monitor the protesters if they were allowed free access to the 
concourse, and the Authority may need to hire additional 
guards to ensure protesters are adhering to the policy and to 
prevent altercations.11 
                                              
11  Sipe testified that, during the circus protests that took 
place under the terms of the preliminary injunction, he hired 
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 In light of this testimony—as well as commonsense 
inferences about the need to maintain crowd control on the 
concourse—we conclude the location condition is reasonable. 
In assessing Defendants’ interests, our focus is not only “the 
disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely 
to [Plaintiffs].” Lee, 505 U.S. at 685 (quoting Heffron, 452 U.S. 
at 652). We must also consider the potentially “much larger 
threat to [Defendants’] interest in crowd control if all other 
[protest groups] could likewise move freely.” Id. (quoting 
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 653). Here, especially considering the 
concourse’s limited purpose of facilitating the movement of 
Arena patrons between the parking lots and gates, it is sensible 
for the Arena to maintain a policy that minimizes congestion 
and interference with the pedestrian flow. Cf. N.J. Sports, 691 
F.2d at 162 (concluding that “maintaining [pedestrian] traffic 
and crowd control” justified solicitation ban, as solicitation 
“impede[s]” the “necessary free movement” of thousands of 
patrons “mov[ing] rapidly . . . through the parking lot and 
stadium”) (citation omitted). The Arena’s related security and 
safety concerns are also legitimate. It is not unreasonable to 
anticipate disruption if protesters were allowed throughout the 
concourse, particularly if a patron is confronted face-to-face by 
a protester she or he finds aggressive or disagreeable.12 For 
                                              
three additional security officers to assist with monitoring the 
protesters. 
12  Indeed, the video evidence presented at trial showed one 
minor confrontation between a patron and a protester at a 2016 
circus performance. Pomicter II, 322 F. Supp. 3d at 565. The 
patron reacted negatively to the protesters’ message and 
“raised his middle finger to [a] protestor.” Id. The protesters 
ignored the incident, and the patron moved along. Pomicter 
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these reasons, we conclude the location condition is 
reasonable. 
 
Plaintiffs’ counterarguments are unavailing in a 
nonpublic forum, where our review is limited to 
reasonableness. Plaintiffs contend that “the availability . . . of 
other strategies” for addressing crowd control and safety 
undermines Defendants’ explanation. Appellee’s Br. 31. While 
allowing up to 20 protesters access to a limited area of the 
concourse, as the District Court did, or creating buffer zones, 
as Plaintiffs suggest, may be less restrictive, Defendants are not 
required to narrowly tailor speech restrictions in a nonpublic 
forum. Moreover, Defendants’ legitimate concerns about the 
administrability of these more narrowly tailored restrictions 
further support the reasonableness of the location condition. 
Cf. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809 (approving speech restriction in 
part “because it would be administratively unmanageable if 
access could not be curtailed in a reasonable manner”). And 
although Plaintiffs stress that there is no evidence about past 
congestion or security problems on the concourse, Defendants 
do not need to prove that picketing and leafletting would 
“actually disrupt the intended function of its property.” 
NAACP, 834 F.3d at 445 (citation and quotation omitted). 
Instead, as noted, Defendants are entitled to develop 
prophylactic policies to avoid these risks rather than react after 
they occur. 
                                              
also testified that at protests “there’s always a few people 
[who] will say something negative,” but she “just ignore[s] it.” 
App. 239. Though we commend Pomicter and her fellow 
protesters for not engaging with combative patrons, we agree 
with Sipe’s concern that such confrontations have the potential 
to escalate. 
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Plaintiffs also contend that the “minimally intrusive 
nature of leafletting”—as compared to solicitation—
distinguishes this case from other cases finding solicitation 
bans reasonable. Appellees’ Br. 27. Plaintiffs rely primarily on 
International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, where 
the Supreme Court upheld a solicitation ban but rejected a 
leafletting ban within airport terminals. 505 U.S. at 685. Justice 
O’Connor’s controlling concurring opinion emphasized that 
the government had offered no justification at all for banning 
leafletting separate from banning solicitation. Id. at 691 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).13 In the absence of any 
explanation, the Court could not infer that leafletting—which 
it recognized was far less disruptive than solicitation—was 
incompatible with the shopping mall–like “multipurpose 
environment” of the terminal.14 Id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). Unlike in Lee, here Defendants have directly 
explained that any protest activity outside the designated areas 
could cause congestion or safety problems. While solicitation 
may be more disruptive than picketing and leafletting, we 
accept that these protest activities may also cause obstruction 
and congestion. See N.J. Sports, 691 F.2d at 161 (“Generally, 
                                              
13  As we have previously explained, “Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in [Lee] . . . speak[s] for the Court” as to its 
holding that the leafletting ban was unconstitutional. NAACP, 
834 F.3d at 444–45. 
14  The context for this finding is important. Lee was 
decided in 1992, a time when airport terminals were “generally 
accessible to the general public.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 675. At these 
terminals, members of the public could go to “various 
commercial establishments such as restaurants, snack stands, 
bars, newsstands, and stores of various types.” Id. 
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the need to maintain public order justifies greater restrictions 
on active conduct such as picketing . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
The concourse is also a different forum from the airport 
terminals in Lee, which hosted “a wide range of activities” and 
“extensive, nonforum-related activity.” 505 U.S. at 688, 691 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Here, the forum has a single 
purpose: facilitating the entry and exit of patrons to the Arena. 
The location condition, intended to minimize any interference 
with the safe flow of patrons, is closely connected to that 
purpose. Cf. Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1290–91 (concluding a 
leafletting ban in a theater entryway is reasonable because of 
“risk of congestion” and the limited purpose of the forum). 
Finally, we note Justice O’Connor concluded by stipulating she 
would find reasonable a policy confining leafletting to a 
“relatively uncongested part of the airport terminals.” Lee, 505 
U.S. at 692. As this adjustment resembles the “designated 
areas” used by the Arena, it further supports our decision to 
uphold the location condition. 
 
Our conclusion that the Arena’s location condition is 
reasonable should not be mistaken to suggest that it is an 
insignificant burden on speech. Plaintiffs would be on strong 
footing and may very well prevail were this a public forum, 
where the narrow tailoring requirement “demand[s] a close fit 
between ends and means.” McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 
486 (2014); see also Turco v. City of Englewood, --- F.3d ---, 
2019 WL 3884456, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 19, 2019). But for 
nonpublic forums the Supreme Court has made clear there is 
no “requirement that [a] restriction be narrowly tailored.” 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809. In these circumstances, because 
Defendants have met their “light” burden to show the location 
condition is reasonable in light of the purpose of the concourse, 
we cannot require more. See NAACP, 834 F.3d at 449. 
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2. 
We next consider the profanity ban, which specifically 
prohibits the “[u]se of profanity” by protesters, as well as 
“[a]ny promotional verbiage suggesting vulgarity or 
profanity.” App. 400. Defendants’ justification for this 
restriction is that “customers of the Arena should not be 
subjected to profane or vulgar language when attending a 
sports or entertainment event at the Arena.” Appellants’ Br. 36; 
see also App. 277. In determining whether the profanity ban is 
reasonable, we are guided by our opinion in NAACP, 834 F.3d 
435. As noted, the Philadelphia Airport explained its ban on 
noncommercial advertising as part of its efforts to create a 
pleasant environment within the entire Airport. But this 
explanation was inconsistent with the environment of the 
Airport; we observed that there was an “onslaught” of 
noncommercial, controversial content throughout the Airport. 
Id. at 447. Because there was “little logic” to the inference that 
the city “would devote its advertising space to a purpose to 
which the rest of the Airport does not subscribe,” we concluded 
the ban on noncommercial advertising alone was not 
reasonable. Id. 
 
We employ the same analysis and reach the same result 
here. Defendants’ explanation for the speech restriction is that 
they don’t believe customers should be subjected to profanity 
or vulgarity while attending Arena events. To determine if this 
is a valid restriction, we must consider whether it is consistent 
with “the atmosphere” at the Arena. Id. Defendants admit that 
the policy applies only to protesters, and there appears to be no 
similar ban or restrictions for patrons, staff, or others on the 
concourse. The restriction likewise does not apply within the 
Arena itself; there is no equivalent ban that applies to 
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performers or athletes that are part of Arena events. Though 
Defendants’ goal may be legitimate, their means of achieving 
it is not. They cannot meet their goal by singling out protesters 
on the concourse. Accordingly, like the policy at issue in 
NAACP, we cannot conclude the Arena’s internally 
inconsistent profanity ban, applied exclusively to protesters, is 
reasonable. 
 
 
3. 
Finally, we turn to the artificial voice amplification ban. 
Defendants offer two explanations for the policy: first, that 
voice amplification could “interfere” with other activity at the 
Arena, such as announcements, “commercial vendors present 
on the premises,” or “the event inside the Arena”; and second, 
that it would “annoy the patrons as they enter and exit the 
building.” Appellants’ Br. 35. Because Defendants have not 
met their burden to establish the ban is reasonable in light of 
the purpose of the forum, we agree with the District Court that 
the amplification ban is unconstitutional on this record. 
 
At trial, Sipe briefly testified about the potential 
interference caused by voice amplification. He said the Arena 
is “installing” a “sound system . . . that’s playing some arena 
policies for guests.” App. 277. In addition, the Arena 
“sometimes” has shows that sell merchandise outside the 
Arena, “so any voice amplification that would be louder than 
theirs would . . . inhibit that sale.” App. 276.  Finally, 
amplification “could potentially, if it’s loud enough, interfere 
with what’s going on inside the venue.” App. 277. This limited 
testimony appears to be the extent of the record about the 
Arena’s amplification ban. The District Court found that this 
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evidence was not enough to warrant a blanket ban, and instead 
in its final order allowed the Arena to promulgate a “rule that 
may restrict protesters from using voice amplification in 
specified contexts, in order to prevent potential interference 
with other permitted activities within the Arena.” App. 44. We 
agree with the Court’s well-reasoned decision. 
 
 Our opinion in NAACP makes clear that it is the 
government’s burden to provide a legitimate “explanation as to 
why certain speech is inconsistent with the intended use of the 
forum.” 834 F.3d at 445 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 691–92 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). The explanation must be 
supported by record evidence, or the record must “contain[] . . 
. information from which we can draw an inference that would 
support” the explanation. Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 692 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). Either way, “courts must have 
some way of evaluating restrictions.” Id. Here, the brief and 
equivocal references in Sipe’s testimony are not enough to 
provide a basis for us to assess whether the restrictions are 
reasonable.  
 
Sipe’s description of the Arena’s sound system is 
tentative and vague. Though Defendants can rely on the 
purposes of the Arena more broadly in explaining speech 
restrictions, they still must explain how the protected speech 
would interfere with those purposes. As mentioned, Sipe 
testified the Arena was “installing” a sound system, which 
suggests it may not even be operational. And even assuming 
the sound system is functional, there is no indication where the 
sound system operates, how often announcements are made, or 
how loudly the announcements are broadcast. Absent this type 
of information, which would allow us to understand how voice 
amplification might disrupt Arena announcements, we are not 
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willing to infer that amplification “is inconsistent with the 
intended use of the forum.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); see also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732 (“[T]he 
significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in 
light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular 
forum involved.”) (quoting Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650–51). 
 
Sipe’s cursory mention of vendors at the Arena 
similarly lacks substance. Again, the record lacks enough 
information to support an inference that amplification is 
inconsistent with the use of the forum. We are left to guess how 
often vendors use the concourse, where on the concourse they 
stand (including the proximity to the designated areas), and 
whether they even use voice amplification in making sales. 
And in any event, to the extent Sipe’s testimony is that artificial 
voice amplification is permitted for vendors but prohibited for 
protesters, we again run into the problem of the Arena’s 
policies being applied unevenly against protesters. If 
Defendants are concerned about amplification interfering with 
Arena announcements, we do not see how permitting vendors 
to use amplification is consistent with that purpose. See 
NAACP, 834 F.3d at 447. 
 
Moreover, if there is an operational sound system 
playing policies for guests or vendors that use the concourse, 
the District Court’s injunction allows the Authority to enforce 
a policy that “restrict[s] protesters from using voice 
amplification in specified contexts, in order to prevent 
potential interference with other permitted activities within the 
Arena.” App. 44. We hold that Defendants’ interests are 
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sufficiently protected by the Court’s order.15 The terms of the 
injunction also mitigate any potential concern about 
interference with events going on inside the Arena. The 
Authority could, for example, prohibit amplification during (as 
opposed to before and after) performances, which would easily 
and effectively address this concern.16 
 
Defendants finally contend that banning voice 
amplification is necessary to avoid annoying patrons of the 
Arena. Unlike the other explanations, we find no mention of 
this explanation in the record.17 Compounding the lack of 
record support, Defendants do not even attempt to explain the 
connection to the forum. They do not suggest that any 
hypothetical annoyance would have repercussions for the flow 
of pedestrian traffic or otherwise disturb the functioning of the 
Arena. Though amplification may be annoying, absent any 
connection to the purpose of the forum, this alone is 
insufficient to justify the speech restriction. And in NAACP we 
explained that “controversy avoidance” as a governmental 
                                              
15  We note that at oral argument, counsel for Defendants 
could not think of a situation in which the Court’s order would 
interfere with the Arena’s functioning or be problematic to 
administer. Oral Arg. Recording at 6:45–7:53. 
16  The Authority could, alternatively, promulgate a policy 
that sets a certain decibel limit for any amplification. Such a 
restriction would be less prohibitive and allow the protesters’ 
message to reach a larger audience across the concourse, while 
avoiding any potential interference with Arena activity. 
17  As far as we can tell from our review of the appendix, 
this rationale was not raised at all during the trial and the 
District Court therefore did not address it in concluding the 
amplification ban was not reasonable.  
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objective is “nebulous and not susceptible to objective 
verification.” 834 F.3d at 446. While it may sometimes be a 
valid governmental objective, we cautioned against “readily 
drawing inferences, in the absence of evidence, that 
controversy avoidance renders [a] ban constitutional.” Id. 
(citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812). Here, faced with a lack of 
record support demonstrating the justification for the ban or 
connection to the forum, we will not make inferences to fill the 
gaps and accordingly conclude the amplification ban is 
unreasonable. 
 
IV. 
In sum, we conclude that the Arena’s policy 
sequestering protesters to designated areas satisfies the 
reasonableness test for speech restrictions in nonpublic forums. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order on this 
issue and remand for the Court to consider whether the policy 
passes muster under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Although 
we reach this conclusion here, we again emphasize that under 
other circumstances, if the nature of the forum were to change, 
our analysis would be different. With respect to the Arena’s 
protest policies banning profanity and artificial voice 
amplification, however, we agree with the District Court that 
Defendants have not met their burden to show that these 
restrictions are reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum, 
and we will therefore affirm.  
